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Abstract. Advanced ICTs and biometry in mass-surveillance and border control is integral to the
securitization  agenda which  emerged  in  the  early  2000s.  This  agenda  has  been  particularly
instrumental in cultivating migration anxieties and framing the problem of threat as an imperative
to identify those who are dangerous to public safety. As well founded as that may be, this framing
masks the pivotal role ICTs have in the supervision and surveillance of industries and markets. ICTs
are essential  to achieve  all  four freedoms of movement in European market integration,  i.e.,  of
goods,  services,  capital and  persons. They are essential to EU-US trade and investment relations
which are increasingly underpinned by cross-border data flows.  Drawing on mobilities research,
this  chapter  explores  how  the  mobilities  of materials,  commodities,  markets  and  labour  are
simultaneously constrained and facilitated in reference to the obligation in Europe to protect yet
another freedom of movement, that of data. Against efforts to better protect personal data in these
flows, narratives of threat and emergency call for immediate action, whereby any data that can be
intercepted can also be gathered for investigative purposes on the basis of exceptional circumstance.
The securitization agenda finds its practical utility here in the hands of executive powers, avoiding
the legislature and the judiciary. There is no evidence that authorities catch terrorists and criminals
because of advanced ICTs in data intercept. The practical utility lies in the ability to target and
investigate any individual,  any political opposition or exercise in citizen rights to challenge the
socio-economic and moral order. Under the circumstances, the only immediate defence available is
self-censorship.  Publics  have  no  meaningful  way of  objecting  to  states  of  exception  in  which
illiberal  practices  are  legitimized,  and neither  does  the  legislature  and the  judiciary unless  the
checks on executive powers are adequately reined in.
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1. Instrumentality and practical utility 2
Security is the watchword with which to refer to public safety and the safeguarding of first-world
economies, markets, democracy and our mobile lives. The growth of industries and markets since
the second world war coincides with new freedoms of movement, now protected across the Single
Market of the European Economic Area (EEA) and in market relations with the United States and
beyond. The sustainability of such freedoms is increasingly at issue however. Evidence of political
dissidence  and  hostility  toward  the  socio-economic  order  and  the  leadership  of  first-world
democracies and corporate enterprise, give rise to insecurities for which securitization has become
the all-round remedy.
This chapter addresses a set of issues that tie together securitization objectives in reference to
industries and markets, economic leadership and the mobilities afforded by European integration
and associated transnational developments. The EEA protects the free movement of goods, services,
capital and persons (European Parliament Fact Sheets 2000). Among other things, it supports the
abolition  of  customs  duties  on  industrial  goods,  the  free  movement  of  financial  services,
telecommunication, information, media services, transport and energy, the freedom of ownership
and right to take up residence and employment in any of the EU/EEA member states without visa
formalities.  Accordingly,  the  supervision  of  cross-border  mobilities  in  Europe  falls  on  shared
regulatory provisions, including the bureaucratic and technical oversight of EU/EEA and Schengen
agreements in these matters.3
As  regards  alliances  beyond  Europe  however,  European  states  have  tacitly  accepted  the
leadership of the United States in economic, political and military affairs, with relations stretching
further afield tainted by a history of colonialism and exploitation. Calls for democracy on behalf of
some of  those  others,  come typically on the  back of coercive  economic  and market  practices,
instigated and policed by the US and former European empires (e.g.  Dalacoura 2005; Carothers
2003). While conditions like that give rise to grave concerns over lasting social,  economic and
territorial  discord,  hence  questions  of  adequacy  with  respect  to  our  leadership,  transnational
partnerships  are  adapting  to  signs  of  change.  But,  as  the  official  argument  goes,  first-world
leadership will have to remake itself in an era of new economic powers, and “[t]hat begins with our
economic leadership” (Obama 2011).4 With that in mind, the most significant trade and investment
relationship globally is the one between European states and the US, a relationship increasingly
underpinned by cross-border flows of data (Meltzer 2014).
This chapter  takes as a point of departure that the proliferation of advanced  information and
communication technologies (ICTs) in mobility control and surveillance, has very publicly served
preoccupations with imminent threat of illicit migration and acts of crime and terror. It argues that
such preoccupations, regardless of how well founded they may be, mask the pivotal role ICTs have
in the practical supervision and oversight of transnational markets, industry and finance, and they
ignore how much of the threat might be rooted in colonial history and first-world leadership.  The
following  sections  discuss  the  question  of  cohesion  in  transnational  development  against  the
underpinnings of markets in data flows and ICT-based innovation, and how to move away from
instrumentalizing the securitization agenda to a point where publics have  no meaningful way of
challenging it. To put it rather crudely, the agenda to-date has been dominated by a no-win scenario:
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would 'you' not give up some civil liberties, personal data and privacy, so authorities can catch
terrorists and keep you safe? This particular framing is not systematically challenged – of course
you would – while it holds within the self-evidence of interoperable and integrated ICT systems, of
biometric identification, visa registries and related applications (Amoore 2006). Ethicists and legal
scholars have taken more or less at face value the focus here in governance on striking the right
balance between the freedoms of individuals and providing them with security. Among other things,
their  work  attempts  to  clarify  what  is  at  stake  if  a  right  to  privacy  and  self-determination  is
diminished  or  taken  away  (see  Laas-Mikko  and  Sutrop  this  volume).  New  privacy enhancing
technologies have seen light, new data processing principles, and attempts are made to improve on
existing legal frameworks in Europe, in particular, with the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR)  proposal  (European  Parliament  2013).  However,  this  balancing  metaphor  does  not
adequately reflect citizens' perceptions which are found to be somewhat divided between those who
see their privacy infringed on without improved security and those who see their security enhanced
without privacy infringement (Pavone and Esposti 2010). More importantly, widely researched and
debated concerns over first-world liberties and citizen rights, draw attention away from the role of
the securitization agenda in protecting the free movement of data. Against concerns that rights and
liberties are at risk and in need of protection from the very methods of delivering security, the free
movement of data is the versatile materiality of economic competitiveness and growth. Productivity
and cohesion depend on it  along with the pursuits  of other freedoms of movement with which
transnational industries and markets progress.
Taking these considerations into account, the question remains how to re-frame the securitization
agenda to foreground the issues that  are obscured by the no-win scenario and the metaphor of
striking a balance. Firstly, there is nothing to prove that authorities catch terrorists and criminals
because of biometric registries and cutting-edge ICTs. There is nothing to suggest a categorical
change  in  a  long  history  of  record-keeping  and  investigative  techniques  for  operational  and
administrative purposes of states and constabularies. Advancing ICTs in surveillance and record-
keeping, and implementing biometry for identification, is widely seen as a matter of  efficiency,
convenience and service quality (see Rommetveit, this volume). Secondly, when authorities identify
threat and justify surveillance in the name of security, they appear to be targeting political activism
against  war  and  social  injustices,  including  members  of  Occupy (Poitras  2014),  or  those  who
mobilize against various scientific, technological and other societal ventures (e.g. Welsh and Wynne
2013). In reference to exceptional circumstance, framed in militaristic terms as threat or as criminal
investigation, authorities decide what they need and what to do, and involve publics by command,
not  consent  and consultation (see  Agamben 2005 on state  of  exception).  In  the  United  States,
authorities  are  known  to  subpoena  the  online  service  industries  and  other  commerce  for  the
personal data they process, i.e., to gain insights into who the culprits are or these publics-as-threat
on their watch lists. The result is a growing number of self-censoring publics, as we also learn from
the Snowden revelations that authorities in European states have been depending upon access to
precisely the same sorts of insights with assistance from the United States.5 This practical utility of
the securitization agenda has been shrouded in secrecy while the agenda is still  instrumental in
amplifying  visions  of  vulnerable – but  irrelevant  –  publics,  apparently ignorant  of  the  security
threats surrounding them.
2 Mobilities: associations and relations
Transnational development in tourism, migration, markets and mobile employment are among
the many study topics  found in the academic discourse on contemporary mobilities.  Mobilities
research is focussed on the technological and material conditions of persons, objects and ideas on
5 See http://www.statewatch.org/eu-usa-data-surveillance.htm .
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the move and in stasis. It aims to clarify the political, cultural and socio-economic relevance of
mobility or the lack thereof (e.g. Gill et al. 2011; Scuzzarello and Kinnvall 2013; Jordan and Brown
2007;  Stephenson 2006;  Tyler  2006;  Urry 2007).  We learn  how mobilities  feature  in  personal,
occupational  and  organizational  lives,  including  the  many “[i]ssues  of  movement,  of  too  little
movement or too much, or of the wrong sort or at the wrong time” (Sheller and Urry 2006: 208).
Not  only do persons  and things  flow through transits,  but  also  through cyberspace  by way of
recordings and representations, and the re-creation of governance and prominent imaginaries using
transportable media. In short, mobilities are deployed and consumed in the course of achieving what
are considered normal commitments and obligations (Shove 2002). They satisfy a need to sustain
proximity (Urry 2002),  a  will  to connection (Sheller and Urry 2006),  and they require constant
management.
The EU/EEA and Schengen agreements are only two examples of a whole complex of relations
and associations Europeans are committed to  across the region,  to align and mobilize common
interests  (Fig.1).  The  countries  of  Europe  also  enter  into  myriad  of  non-EU/EEA agreements.
Consulting the EU Treaties Office Database reveals bilateral and multilateral treaties with USA,
Canada, Brazil, China, and many other countries and regions around the globe. Among the shared
interests are agriculture, commercial policy, competition, culture, economic and monetary affairs,
education,  energy,  environment,  fisheries,  food  safety,  foreign  and  security  policy,  information
society,  research and innovation,  taxation,  trade and transport  (see  also  European Commission,
2009).
These treaties represent economic, social and market opportunities, which has contributed to the
4
Fig 1: A diagram showing supranational relations and associations within the boundaries of the Council of Europe, plus 
Vatican City, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kosovo. Associations across Europe change over time and so have the Euler 
diagrams in this and related Wikipedia entries, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Economic_Area (May 2015).
normalization of mobilities as the way forward. On the face of it, these developments appear as “a
promising sign of global newness and future-making” (Gill  et  al.  2011; Adey 2010),  a form of
cosmopolitanism, manifested in enhanced freedoms and opportunities to prosper across the globe in
an era of declining nation states. However, we are warned against associating mobility uncritically
with liberation from nationhood and widespread personal freedoms (e.g. Cresswell 2006). Borders
and other checkpoints continue to delineate and connect, divide and categorize persons and cargo,
reject, admit, contain and alienate, and they are contentious in political debate.
2.2 Politics of cohesion
The  instrumentality of  the  securitization  agenda is  based  in  growing insecurities  concerning
economic,  social  and  territorial  cohesion.  Across  Europe,  cohesion  is  seen  as  essential  to  the
stability of the Single Market and the European Union (EU) has a pivotal role to play in staging its
moral character on the basis of the EU constitution. The Union shall “offer its citizens an area of
freedom,  security  and  justice  without  internal  frontiers,  [...]  combat  social  exclusion  and
discrimination,  and  [...]  promote  social  justice  and protection”  as  well  as  solidarity  (European
Union 2010,  Art.3 of Common Provisions p.17). But, social and territorial cohesion is subject to
doubt when the distribution of opportunities, wealth and welfare is unequal among member states,
some of which are also grappling with internal unrest. States in Europe are not equal with respect to
their  governance  traditions  and  development.  There  are  significant  differences  to  be  observed
between the northern, central and southern territories. Some states are richer than others and some
more influential in cooperation on matters of economy, markets, innovation and societal affairs.
These  differences  influence  the  ways  in  which  the  mobility  of  persons  is  looked  upon and
managed. The current amount of mass irregular travel and nomadic labour was not anticipated in
the early days  of the Single Market and the entitlement to protection of labour  conditions and
mobility for all has not always been welcome, not even within Schengen. The second paragraph in
Article 2 of the Schengen agreement allows for unilateral reintroduction of border checks, i.e., spot
checks, which are periodically invoked in relation to events or exceptional circumstance seen as a
threat to security and the public order (Council  of the European Communities 2000; Apap and
Carrera 2003). For example, migration anxieties surfaced in 2011, in relation to the so-called Arab
spring when Italians saw an influx of migrants from the conflict zones on their shores (Scuzzarello
and  Kinnvall  2013).  The  decision  to  issue  temporary  residence  permits  to  Tunisian  refugees
triggered  patrol  on  the  French-Italian  borders  to  stop  that  migration  going  further  north.  Anti-
immigrant sentiments were also heard in Denmark at the time, however, with focus not only on
migrants from the Maghreb region, but from Poland and the Baltic states. Similar anxieties were
evident  in  warnings  of disproportionate  migration resulting from the enlargement  of  the EU to
eastern regions—concerns, not entirely void of scepticism about social-cultural kinship (Kvist 2004;
Bauer and Zimmermann 1999). The delay in opening the doors to citizens of the new member states
was allegedly to protect social infrastructures and, as these words are written, migration anxieties
are soaring yet again in relation to a whole new refugee crisis, with huge numbers fleeing warfare in
Syria  over  borders  into  Europe.  Again,  internal  borders  are  being  temporarily  reinstated  on  a
number of fronts and the outer Schengen borders reinforced.
Scuzzarello  and  Kinnvall  argue  that  these  kinds  of  events  show  how  quickly  borders  are
reclaimed and  ideas  of  a  collective  self  and national  identity  reinstated  in  political  and media
discourse. This happens periodically within the EEA and Schengen and one can argue that Europe
remains  geographically,  culturally  and  economically  divided  regardless  of  the  protection  of
freedoms to facilitate the Single Market and relations beyond.6 Those from outside the EEA and the
6 Crossing patrolled borders between Norway and Denmark since the conflict with the Islamic State began, also 
illustrates some of the complications faced within Schengen when EEA citizens get involved in such conflicts.
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Americas,  in  particular,  from where  asylum-seekers  and  economic  migrants  originate,  are  also
neither wanted nor welcome by authorities. They are not the  ideal foreigners,  the educated and
mostly white who arrive with social, cultural and economic capital to travel, study, work, consume
and even settle (see Tyler 2006, on the UK case). There are opportunities  for some to study and
accept  job  offers  across  state  lines  and there  is  a  tourist  trade  aimed at  those  with  disposable
incomes. Frequent long-distance travel remains privileged however, and so is effectively the so-
called global workforce. As Castells puts it,
[w]hile capital flows freely in the electronic circuits of global financial networks, labor is still
highly constrained,  and  will  be  for  the  foreseeable  future,  by institutions,  culture,  borders,
police, and xenophobia (Castells 2010: 247).
If  these  observations  are  anything to  go  by,  only the  privileged labour  force  of  specialized
professions are living their lives across national borders with relative ease and comfort (also Cooper
and Rumford 2013). At the same time, an intensification of labour mobility and tourism was seen in
all regions of the world toward the end of the last century (e.g. Massey et al. 1998) and the trend
continues. Being  open for business however, opens the doors to both legitimate and illegitimate
flows. Mobile capital benefits from an authority structure that defends its mobility and privilege, but
the intensification of dissidence and hostilities, aimed at  free-market democracies and corporate
enterprise,  calls  for new priorities in  thinking about the cohesion of transnational markets.  The
securitization rationale has adopted narratives that depict particular kinds of flows as trusted against
flows that are a threat to the socio-economic and moral order—narratives that mediate belonging,
set the threshold for inclusion, and demand that mobility data is made available to authorities in the
name of security.
3. Mobility controls and the fifth freedom
Drawing on mobilities  research,  one  can argue that  agreements  like the  EEA and Schengen
constrain as much as they facilitate the freedoms of movement but, also, that the movement of data
deserves  closer  attention.  It  is  key  to  the  practical  utility of  securitization.  Modern  states  are
increasingly more mobile to keep up with persons, capital and commodities (Beck 2005, 2008).
They need to  keep up with  an economy which  is  informational as  well  as  globally organized
(Castells  2010),  drawing  together  materials,  commodities,  markets  and  labour,  along  with  the
business models and the organizational management for which the free movement of data is an
absolute necessity. Within the EEA, the free movement of data is effectively the fifth freedom, and
even if not explicitly recognised as such, an Informational EEA is obliged to protect that freedom.
This  is  evident,  for instance,  in  the preamble of  the GDPR, stating the aim to  protect  the free
movement of data across the internal market.7 
Historically,  all  sorts  of  data  are  processed for  supervision and operational  surveillance.  For
example,  the  types  of  surveillance  on  persons  manifested  in  public  registries  have  heritage  in
record-keeping and investigative techniques for social security entitlements, tax collection, election
management,  healthcare,  border  control,  intelligence  and  ordinary  policing.  Outsourcing  the
processing of these data to private and corporate agencies has gone on for years, but the more
advanced  surveillance  and  security  systems  –  including  biometry  –  have  a  history  as  well  in
banking, industry, insurance and commerce (Lodge 2006).
A significant amount of data on persons is  now in circulation throughout the economy (and
7 The title of the GDPR proposal also states that it is a “Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data”  (in May 2015, the legislation of the GDPR in the EU Parliament was estimated to happen in 2017).
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growing),  either  identifiable  or  clustered  by  type in  reference  to  locality,  mobility,  biophysical
profiles, action, preference, and behaviour.8 Huge amounts of data on persons are processed by the
service industries and in marketing with the bulk of it now generated by individuals themselves.
Targeted marketing and so-called personalized services rely on customers volunteering data and, as
the argument goes, blanket restrictions will harm competitiveness by undercutting existing business
models, back-office efficiency, new service discovery and the delivery of customer service quality
(European Parliament 2012).
It follows here that in a  world in which mobilities are imperative to a successful trade across
borders and regions, ICTs are essential to the surveillance of marketing efficiency as much as they
are to the surveillance of productivity and returns. Research into targeted marketing has led the way
for decades on how and why mobilities should be traced and monitored (e.g.  Phillips and Curry
2003). For example, it  has shown the difficulty in relating geographically localized populations
(geodemographics)  to  sociological  ideals  about  identity,  lifestyle  choice,  circumstance  and
preference. These failings in defining localized groups suggests that knowledge of persons could be
better established by following them around. Similar advantages are surfacing more recently with
growing use of mobile sensors, i.e., to establish knowledge on movement, biophysical and health-
related profiles. Transactions and logs are monitored to target any such knowledge with reasonable
accuracy, for example, in using the internet, mobile and smart phones, sensors, service systems of
sorts, machine-readable cards and any other transaction-type or logged event.
The analogy here with border control describes how any place, physical or virtual, can be turned
into a checkpoint. Individuals are intercepted, asked to identify themselves and clarify their travels,
activities and transactions, aspirations, intentions, the goods and keepsakes that travel in their name.
These practices exemplify both facilitation and restriction of mobility, with private and corporate
enterprise increasingly managing all manner of such checkpoints at their own discretion. The idea
that people's intentions can likewise be detected and intercepted has gained significant momentum,9
and the commercial interests and economic gains of the software and communications industries
give  rise  to  suspicion  that  governments  are  not  entirely  in  control  of  how  to  regulate  these
developments. The fifth freedom here has neither been conspicuous nor transparent to publics at
large. They are not critically involved in assessment and decision-making on matters concerning the
collection  and  processing  of  personal  and  potentially  sensitive  data,  nor  the  extent  to  which
surveillance  can  be  practised  by  private  and  corporate  agencies  for  commercial  purposes  and
economic gain.
3.1 Self-censoring publics
The  securitization  agenda  has  shifted  the  focus  in  law  enforcement,  security  and  related
operations, toward pervasive surveillance for investigative purposes which takes advantage of the
data flows in the service industries. As Lyon observed (2003), surveillance is “a feature of everyday
life, at work, at home, at play, on the move” (p. 13), and the Snowden revelations provide stunning
insights into precisely the extent to which surveillance takes place and how publics are targeted
(Poitras 2014). The latest technological advancements are mobilized to this effect with the shift
toward preventative scenarios involving research into the remote monitoring of persons in large
numbers. Cameras are attached to video content analysis, combined with biometric techniques for
8 It can be argued that data clustering by types anonymizes data, i.e., the data controller is not interested any one 
person's official identity, only that such and such a person is of such and such a type. This is debatable however, 
since the goal is typically to be able to intercept types of persons via email, web browsing, phone messaging or old 
fashioned mail, all of which is ultimately traceable back to actual individuals.
9 See for example, https://www.informationsystems.foi.se/main.php/ADABTS_Final_Demo.pdf?fileitem=7340169 
and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Attribute_Screening_Technology .
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facial recognition, behavioural pattern recognition and remote sensing of physiological states. It is
unclear however, what is actually achieved with all this data mining, statistical categorizations of
dangerous groups,  profiling  of  individuals,  and  ICT-assisted  predictions  of  future  events  (on
profiling see Hildebrandt and Gutwirth 2008; Hildebrandt 2008).
Serious  doubts have been raised about the investigative and preventative scenarios in recent
times,  and it is yet unclear whether or not such systems eventually come online to achieve what
designers  have  hoped for  (Hornung et  al.  2010;  Schlanger  2011).  Those who work within  the
agencies  investing significant  sums in this  research are choosing their  carefully,  e.g.,  “it  is  not
currently, and may never become, operational” or “deployment, if it ever occurs” (Schlanger 2011:
2). The technology does not appear to be very reliable and extensive ethical and legal reviews have
called for adjustments, with some projects abandoned entirely or scaled down to small location-
specific applications. As general investigative tools however, advanced surveillance systems along
with  the  data  logging  and  profiling  that  underpins  existing  business  models,  management  and
discovery in the service industries, are providing unprecedented access to data for search-and-match
purposes.
The danger here is losing sight of opportunities to meaningfully object to the pursuit of executive
powers to intercept data flows and logs in these systems. As Snowden has put it (Poitras 2014),
publics are self-censoring if they live with the expectation of being watched all the time. Indeed, it
appears that speaking of liberties and freedom has been captured in the notion of privacy in the very
particular sense that not having privacy is a loss of a person's agency because they no longer feel
free to express what they think (Applebaum, cf. Poitras 2014). Privacy is here primarily linked to
freedom of speech and expression.10
If we don't have our right to privacy, how do we have a free and open discussion? What good is
the right to free speech if it isn't protected in the sense that you can't have a private discussion
with somebody else about something you disagree with. Think about the chilling effect that that
has.  (Levison  at  the  hearings  in  EU  parliament  on  NSA surveillance  of  EU  citizens  and
companies, Sept. 2013, cf. Poitras 2014, 1:38:45-1:39:05).
It may seem that a distinction between private and public needs to be ascertained here, and how
the two intersect. Any given communication can be more or less private or public, and not obvious
when indeed one is free to express one's opinion given the incentives to self-censor, for example,
not to be associated with certain persons, politics and events, and not be put on some watch list or
other. The same can be said about avoiding physical attire and behaviour that may give rise to
alarm. But, distinctions of public and private are not at issue here, rather, the conditions by which
self-censoring becomes a feature of everyday life. As it stands, individuals and groups are posed
against a coalition of agencies, whose personnel are learning how the most advanced technologies
can assist them in detection—how security and surveillance systems aimed at everyone can assist in
establishing ever more detailed knowledge on who they are and if they are welcome or a threat, and
in preventing certain kinds of events from happening. This positioning may well sit on a continuum
with older investigative techniques used by state agencies and constabularies to put on a display of
power, to uphold the rule of law, manage mobility risks and investigate acts of crime and terror.
There are well known pros and cons concerning the application of ICTs and biometry as part of
intelligence gathering, and such practices are continuously negotiated in reference to the rights and
liberties of persons, what is proportionate, justified, and so on.11 What is at issue here is rather the
10 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations 1948) states that everyone has the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression. However, widespread self-censorship is a well-known phenomenon, 
notably in recent US history during the McCarthy era and in recent European history east of the Iron Curtain.
11 An issue repeatedly foregrounded during the ICTethics expert workshop on “Human Security in the context of 
Ambient Intelligence”, Nov 2010, Leeds, UK.
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tensions  that  arise  when  such  a  versatile  materiality  of  global  economic  competitiveness  and
growth,  data,  is exposed to exceptional circumstance, whereby personal data  – in fact any data –
can be  subpoenaed or otherwise intercepted for purposes no one can truly challenge.  The GDPR
proposal,  as  it  stands,  may be an  attempt  to  improve upon the  protection  of  personal  data,  of
clarifying the ramifications of data processing and retention in an era of increasingly more powerful
technologies.12 When it comes to pass however, it will have no force in challenging data operations
relating to criminal investigations, security or terrorist prevention programmes—areas of activity
where publics will need protection the most if the practical utility of securitization is primarily to
target political resistance couched a as threat to public safety and the socio-economic order. Publics
may have no choice left but to self-censor while there are still good reasons to speak up and act in
defiance of authorities on a range of deeply contentious issues, including social injustices, decisions
on  warfare,  the  direction  of  the  socio-economic  system  and  the  purposes  more  generally  of
scientific, technological and other societal ventures.
4. Keeping what safe? 13
The four freedoms of movement, as stated in the EEA agreement, do not immediately signify
how mobilities leave behind traces of transactions that open the doors to pervasive surveillance. It is
not  obvious either  what the fifth freedom signifies in terms of how to protect  individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data.  This chapter began by claiming that the securitization
agenda emerges in consequence of  insecurities, albeit,  there is persistent lack of clarity on why
securitization – as it proceeds – is made to seem inevitable. On the face of it, securitization has been
justified  in  reference  to  enemies  descending on first-world  democracies  and hiding  among the
citizenry. Indeed, the agenda has been particularly instrumental in cultivating migration anxieties,
scepticism over entitlement to mobility and in framing a problem of threat in terms of an imperative
to detect and identify those who are dangerous.
There  is  nothing  to  indicate  here  other  than  a  continuity  of  familiar  old-age  problems  of
oppression  and  resistance,  corruption,  exploitation,  abuse  and  terror,  only  that  these  problems
appear in new guises and involve the latest technologies appropriated by enemies and allies alike.
Narratives of threat and emergency mask this, along with a whole host of considerations that have a
history of  being  ideological  no-go zones.  For  example,  openly debating  with  publics  the  very
purpose  and  direction  of  first-world  leadership  in  economic  affairs,  innovation  and  market
competitiveness, might result in 'unpalatable' demands to do things differently. Such debates are yet
to be had in organized ways and reported on in mainstream media, involving key decision-makers
along with citizen juries or other  recognised methods of public  engagement.14 Openly debating
whether or not our leadership is sustainable, in particular, if it erodes the cohesion it is meant to aim
for, may call for an honest reflection on the rhetoric of  leadership  and of  keeping us safe. When
used by leaders and mainstream media, such rhetoric draws the attention away from state-sponsored
12 As this is written (May 2015), legislating the GDPR is not expected to happen until 2017 after years already of 
preparations and thousands of amendments, many of which are watering down the obligations of data controllers in 
order to safeguard business models, economic and innovation competitiveness.
13 Some of these concluding remarks I owe to an inspiring meeting (Jan 2014) with the Icelandic parliamentarian, 
Birgitta Jónsdóttir and internet pioneer, Guðmundur Ragnar Guðmundsson, in particular, their thoughts on digital 
self-defence in contemporary consumer culture, and the lack of teeth in the GDPR proposal and similar efforts with 
respect to scope and jurisdiction.
14 Debates that really shake the core assumptions on which the economy rests, first-world leadership, innovation, 
security, etc., are held in small ways, involving whistleblowers, critics and disillusioned members of established 
institutions who find voice on minor media outlets, typically referred to as left wing or 'too' radical to be on par with 
mainstream communication, e.g., Democracynow! (http://democracynow.org), Counterpunch 
(http://www.counterpunch.org/) and New Statesman (http://www.newstatesman.com/).
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aggression in defending vested interests across the globe, in goods, services, capital, mobile labour
and data (also Herman and Chomsky 1988 on manufacturing consent). Furthermore, narratives of
threat  and  emergency  call  for  immediate  intervention.  Under  the  circumstances,  government
executives  manipulate  the  legislature  to  rush  through  emergency laws,  bypass  the  judiciary  or
ignore both, while going ahead with secret mass-surveillance programmes (Poitras 2014; Harding
2014).15
It is at this juncture that one can see that the insecurities in question here, centre to large extent
on the publics at home. It is also at this juncture that the pivotal role of ICT-based innovation finds
its relevance, as previously stated in this chapter, in conjunction with long-standing practical uses of
surveillance  and  security  technologies  in  industry,  banking,  trade,  commerce  and other  service
sectors. The intensity of contemporary surveillance has been more deeply political than fending off
nebulous enemies from alien cultures who can harm us at any moment. Intelligence, observation
and quantification techniques are used to code and classify persons according to definitions that are
interpretatively flexible and ideal to identify those who mobilize against industry, finance, market
and innovation policies, in the name of public safety (Welsh and Wynne 2013).
Even after the Snowden revelations began, little is yet done in the way of communicating and
critically  debating  in  the  public  domain  the  purposes  with  which  intelligence  and  security
operations proceed and, for Europe in particular, the limits in scope and jurisdiction of the GDPR
(once legislated) in actually protecting persons. Given the strength of the official rhetoric of threat
and emergency, and the silencing of opinion through self-censorship, this is not surprising. But,
democratically  elected  bodies  should  be  held  to  account  for  the  ways  in  which  ICT-driven
surveillance operations are allowed to propagate as the inevitable way forward in defending  our
way of life. There is no evidence that advancing ICTs alone will help remedy dissent and hostility
and  cultivate  cohesion.  Rather,  there  is  good  evidence  that  the  software  and  communications
industries have significant investment in the securitization agenda, while the question remains to
what extent the service industries and markets should comply with the agenda, given how much
their investments depend on data-driven solutions (including targeted marketing).16 In fact, they are
faced with  an  impossibility.  Authorities  can  very effectively leave  most  of  the  monitoring  and
measuring of  everyday mobilities  to  private  and corporate  enterprise  and issue subpoena when
needed.17 Technically, service providers can refrain from retaining data (metadata or content data),
especially identifiable data, but authorities can still intercept all transactions under circumstances
removed from democratic accountability. The only alternatives left then, are to close up shop or
otherwise give way (Levison, cf. Poitras 2014, 1:37.02-1:38:20).
The persistent lack of clarity on the purposes of mass-surveillance, what exactly is kept safe and
who is actually in charge, points to a need for open reflection and debate, albeit, public debates are
not likely to lead if we have entered a climate of self-censorship and, to paraphrase Snowden, if the
boundaries of intellectual exploration have been limited (26:54-26:58).18 One could ask why publics
at large are not more encouraged to consider the pre-eminence of their informational selves and
15 There are many attempts over the past decade to back-track on executive powers, e.g., in summer 2015, a disquiet in
the UK parliament over the lack of transparency regarding the reach of executive powers, including the GCHQ, 
without the mandated checks and balances of a three-tiered government. The US Patriot Acts have also been 
revisited, the US surveillance law, the legality of the Guantánamo Bay detention camp, and more.
16 In the aftermath of the Snowden revelations, the big industry players in ICTs are publishing on this, e.g., IBM on 
regulatory affairs and Microsoft on public policy agendas, and there has been a gradual shift in recent years toward 
seeing privacy sensitivity as a resource for profitable innovation, e.g., in selling to prospective customers privacy-
by-design and protection-by-design products and services.
17 Arrangements like that between government agencies and private enterprise are indicated in the Snowden 
revelations. Yahoo, Google, Facebook, YouTube and Skype were implicated in the PRISM programme (NSA) 
and the UK GCHQ accessing data on persons through that programme, thereby circumventing legal procedures.
10
digital citizenship.19 As it stands, the majority of publics indulge the complacency which is part and
parcel  of free-market  democracy—the comforts  of  consumption,  of ready-to-hand products  and
services,  leaving  them vulnerable  to  marketeers  and  government  agencies  pushing  uncontested
agendas. The majority of publics may not see a risk to their mobility or to their “private and family
life,  home  and  communications”  (European  Communities  2007:  Art.  7),  and  publics  are  not
commonly educated in electronic and digital self defence. There are no provisions for such defence
in the European or US constitutions,20 but guarantees of interoperability between industry software
and  citizens'  initiatives  to  build  digital  and  informational  safety  around  themselves  are  still  a
legitimate demand. As it stands, the software and communications industries cannot be obliged to
use open-source encoding of software, say,  of encryption algorithms, which means there are no
adequate tools to keep industry software in check, in particular, for vulnerabilities to snooping and
other illiberal practices.
What is publicly acceptable should be put to the test here against the practical utility of the
securitization  agenda,  taking  into  account  that  public  acceptability  risks  compromise  when  ill-
defined threats encourage people to accept personal data gathering without asking what it is for
(Pavone and Esposti  2010).  The fifth  freedom may certainly warrant protection for all  sorts  of
practical, educational and entertainment purposes, however, as long as there are serious blunders in
the checks on executive powers, the very idea of having control of personal data protection by way
of law-making (the GDPR), or of one's privacy, is largely void of meaning. Having learned and
enlightened debates across the Atlantic on the importance of privacy, liberty and self-determination
in the making of first-world democracies, on striking the right balance, and so on, is equally futile
when any data that can be collected is,  in all  likelihood,  collected eventually by some agency,
overtly or covertly, processed, disseminated and retained for purposes that are obscured from view
and cannot be contested.  These topics have yet to enter into dialogue that can exercise legitimate
powers of participation and persuasion—to engender a critical re-framing and re-evaluation of the
securitization agenda with a view to much greater checks on executive powers along with a debate
and deliberation on the kinds of future societies first-world citizens can imagine for themselves, not
just at home but in relation to the rest of the world.
References
Adey, Peter. 2010. Mobility. London: Routledge.
Amoore, Louise. 2006. Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror. Political
Geography 25(3):336-351.
Agamben, G. (2005). State of Exception. University of Chicago Press.
Apap, Joanna and Sergio Carrera. 2003. Maintaining Security within Borders: Towards a Permanent
State of Emergency in the EU?  CEPS Policy Briefs 41, October 2003. [Policy Paper].
Bauer, Thomas and Klaus F. Zimmermann. 1999. Assessment of possible migration pressure and its
labour market impact following EU enlargement to central and Eastern Europe – A Study for
18 See also interview with Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras (9 June 2013), in which Snowden elaborates one of 
his key arguments that publics need to be consulted and somehow involved in decisions on the extent to which 
personal data handling is publicly acceptable, in particular, in light of the self-censoring going on. Available at    
http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jun/09/nsa-whistleblower-edward-snowden-interview-video 
(visited Feb 2014)  
19 For example, there could be widespread education programmes from primary school level and upward, teaching on 
these topics, both practice and theory. 
20 It is of some curiosity that US citizens have a constitutional right to armed defence of their person and property 
against threat and oppression, but no such right to defence of their informational person and property.
11
the Department for Education and Employment, United Kingdom. IZA Research Report No. 3.
http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/reports/report_pdfs/report_pdfs/iza_report_03.p
df. Accessed Jan 2014.
Beck, Ulrich. 2005. Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy. London: Polity.
Beck, Ulrich. 2008. Mobility and the cosmopolitan perspective. In Tracing Mobilities. Towards a 
Cosmopolitan Perspective, eds. Weert Canzler, Vincent Kaufmann, and Sven Kesselring, 25-36.
London: Ashgate.
Bigo, Didier. 2007. Mobility Controls and New Technologies. In Are you who you say you are? the 
EU and Biometric Borders, ed. Juliet Lodge, 9-14. The Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers 
(WLP).
Carothers, Thomas. 2003. Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror. Foreign Affairs, 
January/February. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58621/thomas-carothers/promoting-
democracy-and-fighting-terror. Accessed Jan 2014.
Castells, Manuel. 2010. The Rise of The Network Society. The Information Age, Economy, Society 
and Culture, Volume 1 (2nd edition with a new preface). Wiley-Blackwell.
Cooper, Anthony and Chris Rumford. 2013. Monumentalising the Border: Bordering Through 
Connectivity. Mobilities 8(1): 107-124.
Council of the European Communities. 2000. The Schengen Acquis. Official Journal L 239, 
22.9.2000. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:2000:239:0001:0473:EN:PDF. Accessed Jan 2014.
Cresswell, Timothy. 2006. On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World. Taylor & Francis.
Dalacoura, Katerina. 2005. US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 
2001: a critique. International Affairs 81(5): 963-979.
European Commission. 2009. External Relations. European Community/European Union. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/association/docs/agreements_en.pdf. Accessed Jan 2014.
European Commission. 2008. Data Protection in the European Union – Citizen's perceptions (Flash 
Eurobarometer 225), Feb.2008. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_225_en.pdf. 
Accessed Jan 2014.
European Communities. 2007. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Official 
Journal C 303/01. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/32007X1214/htm/C2007303EN.01000101.htm. Accessed Jan 
2014.
European Parliament. 2012. Data Protection Review: Impact on EU Innovation and 
Competitiveness (Study). Directorate General for Internal Policy. Policy Department A: 
Economic and Scientific Policy. PE 492.463. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/492463/IPOL-
ITRE_ET(2012)492463_EN.pdf .
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. 2013. Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation). 
Unofficial consolidated version after LIBE Committee vote; Provided by the rapporteur, 22 
Oct. 2013. http://www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/DPR-Regulation-
inofficial-consolidated-LIBE.pdf. Accessed Feb 2014.
European Parliament Fact Sheets. 2000. 6.3.2. The European Economic Area (EEA). European 
Parliament. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/6_3_2_en.htm. Accessed Jan 2014.
12
European Union. 2010. Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union & Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. Official Journal C 83, 30.3.2010. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?
uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML. Accessed Jan 2014.
Gill, Nick, Javier Caletríob, and Victoria Mason. 2011. Introduction: Mobilities and Forced 
Migration. Mobilities 6(3): 301-316.
Harding, Luke. 2014. Snowden Files. UK: Guardian Books.
Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky. 1988. Manufacturing consent: the political economy of 
the mass media. Pantheon Books.
Hildebrandt, Mireille. 2008. Profiling and the rule of law. Identity in the Information Society 1:55-
70.
Hildebrandt, Mireille and Serge Gutwirth, eds. 2008. Profiling the European citizen: cross-
disciplinary perspectives. Dordrecht, NL: Springer.
Hoback, Cullen, director. 2013. Terms and Conditions May Apply. USA: Hyrax Films.
Hornung, Gerrit, Monika Desoi, and Matthias Pocs. 2010. Biometric Systems in Future Preventive 
Scenarios - Legal Issues and Challenges. In Proceedings of the Special Interest Group on 
Biometrics and Electronic Signatures (BIOSIG 2010) Darmstadt, Germany 9-10 September 
2010, eds. A. Brömme, and C. Busch, pp. 83-95. Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI).
Jordan, Bill and Philip Brown. 2007. Migration and Work in the United Kingdom: Mobility and the 
Social Order. Mobilities 2(2): 255-276.
Kvist, Jon. 2004. Does EU Enlargement Start a Race to the Bottom? Strategic Interaction among 
EU Member States in Social Policy. Journal of European Social Policy 14(3):301-318.
Lodge, Juliet. 2006. Communicating (in)Security: A failure of Public Diplomacy. CHALLENGE: 
Research Paper no.3. Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1155.html. Accessed Jan 2014.
Lyon, David, ed. 2003. Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, risk, and digital discrimination. 
Routledge.  
Massey, Douglas, Joaquín Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward 
Taylor. 1998. Worlds in Motion: International Migration at the End of the Millennium. Oxford 
University Press.
Meltzer, Joshua P. 2014. The importance of the internet and transatlantic data flows for U.S. and 
EU trade and investment (working paper 79). The Brookings Institution: Global Economy & 
Development Program.
Obama, Barak H. 2011. President Obama Addresses the British Parliament, Westminster Hall, 
25.5.2011 London, United Kingdom. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/house_of_commons/newsid_9495000/9495513.stm   . 
Accessed Jan 2014.
Pavone, Vincenzo and Sara D. Esposti. 2010. Public assessment of new surveillance-oriented 
security technologies: beyond the trade-off between privacy and security, Public 
Understanding of Science 21(5), 556-572.
Phillips, David and Michael Curry. 2003. Privacy and the phenetic urge: geodemographics and the 
changing spatiality of the local practice. In Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, risk, and 
digital discrimination, ed. David Lyon, 137-152. Routledge.
Poitras, Laura, director. 2014. Citizenfour (documentary). Praxis Films in association with 
Participant Media and HBO Documentary Films; in co-production with Bertha Foundation, 
13
Britdoc Circle, Channel 4, NDR and BR Media.
Schlanger, Margo, reviewing official. 2011. Civil Rights/Civil Liberties Impact Assessment. Future 
Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) – Interactive and Passive Programs. USA Department 
of Homeland Security. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/crcl/crcl-assessment-fast.pdf. 
Accessed Feb 2014.
Scuzzarello, Sarah and Catarina Kinnvall. 2013. Rebordering France and Denmark. Narratives and 
Practices of Border-Construction in Two European Countries. Mobilities 8(1): 90-106. 
Sheller, Mimi and John Urry. 2006. The new mobilities paradigm. Environment and Planning A 
38(2): 207-226.
Shove, Elizabeth. 2002. Rushing around: coordination, mobility and inequality. Draft paper for the 
Mobile Network meeting, Oct. 2002, Department for Transport, London. 
http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/staff/shove/choreography/rushingaround.pdf. Accessed Jan 2014.
Stephenson, Marcus L. 2006. Travel and the ‘Freedom of Movement’: Racialised Encounters and 
Experiences Amongst Ethnic Minority Tourists in the EU. Mobilities 1(2): 285-306.
The United Nations. 1948. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Publications. 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ . Accessed Jan 2014.
Tyler, Imogen. 2006. 'Welcome to Britain': the cultural politics of asylum. European Journal of 
Culture Studies 9(2) 185-202.
Urry, John. 2007. Mobilities. Polity Press.
Urry, John. 2002. Mobility and Proximity. Sociology 36(2): 255-274.
Welsh, Ian and Brian Wynne, B. 2013. Science, Scientism and Imaginaries of Publics in the UK:
Passive Objects, Incipient Threats. Science as Culture 22(4): 540-566.
14
